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PUTTING CONSTITUTIONAL TEETH INTO A 
PAPER TIGER: HOW TO FIX THE WAR POWERS 
RESOLUTION
Brian J. Litwak*
i. introDuCtion
On March 19, 2011, American and European forces unleashed an aerial attack of  warplanes and 
Tomahawk missiles on a scale unknown to the Arab world since the Iraq War.1   President Obama 
explicitly authorized the use of  the American military to enforce a United Nations-sanctioned no-fly 
zone in Libya.2  Serving as a domestic counter-balance to the President’s actions in Libya was the 
War Powers Resolution (WPR),3 legislation requiring the President to remove all troops engaged in 
hostilities without categorical authorization from Congress within sixty days.4  Sixty-one days after 
the President authorized the use of  American forces, however, those forces were still actively impos-
ing a no-fly zone over Libya in the absence of  congressional authorization.5  Did President Obama 
breach the bounds of  his constitutional authority?  Does the WPR mark a congressional infringe-
ment on the President’s power as commander-in-chief?6  Although the WPR has been the subject 
* Candidate for Doctor of  Jurisprudence, May 2013, University of  North Carolina School of  Law; Articles Editor of  
the North Carolina Law Review; B.S. in Accounting, Georgetown University, Class of  2010. Special thanks to Professor 
Scott Silliman for his guidance during the writing of  this Article. I would like to extend my deepest gratitude to the 
editors of  the American University National Security Law Brief  for their thoughtfulness and diligence during the editing 
of  this Article. 
1  See, e.g., David D. Kirpatrick, Steven Erlanger & Elisabeth Bumiller, Allies Open Air Assault on Qadaffi’s Forces in Libya, 
n.y. tiMes, Mar. 19, 2011, at A1.
2  See id.; see also Helene Cooper & Steven L. Myers, Obama Takes Hard Line with Libya After Shift by Clinton, n.y. 
tiMes, Mar. 18, 2011, at A1 (noting, however, that the use of  force would be limited—no ground troops and a hostile 
engagement lasting “days, not weeks”).
3 War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§1541–48 (2006) [hereinafter War Powers Resolution].
4  See id. § 1544(b) (“Within sixty calendar days . . . the President shall terminate any use of  United States Armed 
Forces . . . unless the Congress (1) has declared war or has enacted a specific authorization for such use of  United States 
Armed Forces, (2) has extended by law such sixty-day period, or (3) is physically unable to meet as a result of  an armed 
attack upon the United States.”).  Technically, pursuant to the WPR, the President must remove the armed forces in sixty 
days with an allowable thirty day extension if  the President certifies to Congress in writing that there is “unavoidable 
military necessity respecting the safety of  [the troops] . . . .”  See id.; discussion infra Part II.A.
5  See, e.g., Felicia Sonmez, Libya Conflict Sparks War Powers Debate in Senate, wash. Post, May 19, 2011, available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/2chambers/post/libya-conflict-sparks-war-powers-debate-in-senate/2011/05/19/
AFpb8I7G_blog.html.
6  u.s. Const. art. II, § 2 (“The President shall be the Commander in Chief  of  the Army and Navy of  the United 
States . . . .”).
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of  much scholarly debate, the overwhelming majority of  commentators largely view it as a legislative 
catastrophe.7
The War Powers Resolution has failed its mandate to create a partnership between Congress and 
the President when deciding to use armed force.  This failure is mainly attributable to its statutory 
language, which effectively prohibits the exercise of  the judiciary from bolstering the WPR’s legal 
credibility.8  However, subtle substantive changes to the WPR can make it a constitutionally operable 
statute capable of  fostering an environment conducive to cooperation between the governmental 
branches, as originally contemplated by its drafters, without infringing on the President’s power as 
commander-in-chief.    
This Article will first briefly discuss the history of  the WPR, the operable provisions, and the 
Executive’s longstanding failure to comply with the WPR.  Part III will analyze the legal ineffective-
ness of  the trigger provisions of  the WPR.  Finally, Part IV will propose amendments to fix the 
WPR and fit it into a constitutionally viable framework. 
ii. the war Powers resolution
“War is Hell.”9  Perhaps no event in United States history exemplified this phrase like the Viet-
nam War.  A congressional resolution permitted Presidents Johnson and Nixon to drag the United 
States through a highly unpopular war (lasting over ten years and causing the loss of  over 58,000 
American lives) without a formal congressional declaration of  war.10  The Vietnam experience cre-
ated a permanent skepticism of  unchecked presidential authority in the war powers arena.11  The 
cynicism of  unchecked Presidential power served as the catalyst driving the drafting of  the WPR.  
Passed over President Nixon’s veto in 1973, the WPR’s stated goal was to “assure that any future 
decision to commit the United States to any warmaking must be shared in by the Congress to be 
7  See, e.g., Michael J. Glennon, Too Far Apart: Repeal the War Powers Resolution, 50 u. MiaMi l. rev. 17 (1995); Thomas 
M. Franck, Rethinking War Powers: By Law or by “Thaumaturgic Invocation”?, 83 aM. J. int’l l. 766 (1989) (arguing that the 
WPR was good in theory, but faulty in its drafting and execution).  But see Michael B. Weiner, Note, A Paper Tiger with 
Bite: A Defense of  the War Powers Resolution, 40 vanD. J. transnat’l l. 861 (2007) (arguing that the WPR has had a positive 
practical effect on the implementation of  presidential unilateral use of  force).  The phrase “paper tiger” has been a 
fitting term used to describe the War Powers Resolution.  A translated Chinese phrase, “paper tiger” is defined as “one 
that is outwardly powerful or dangerous but inwardly weak or ineffectual.”  MerriaM-webster’s Collegiate DiCtionary 
897 (11th ed. 2004).
8  See Franck, supra note 7, at 768–70.
9  General William Tecumseh Sherman, Commencement Address at the Michigan Military Academy (June 19, 1879).
10  The Vietnam War was not a declared war pursuant to Congress’s Article I power.  Rather, Congress authorized the 
President, pursuant to the Gulf  of  Tonkin Resolution, to use armed force in Vietnam, with the resolution to “expire 
when the President shall determine that peace and security of  the area is reasonably assured . . . .”  See DonalD l. 
westerFielD, war Powers: the PresiDent, the Congress, anD the Question oF war 2–3 (1996). This would mark 
the last time Congress permitted the President to use armed force without a time constraint.  See id. 
11  See id. at 4.  This skepticism is alive and well today, often embodied by the common mantra, “Will this [conflict] 
turn into another Vietnam.”  See, e.g., Paul Steinhauser, Will Afghanistan Turn into Another Vietnam?, Cnn PolitiCs (Oct. 
19, 2009), http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2009/10/19/cnn-poll-will-afghanistan-turn-into-another-vietnam/.
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lawful.”12 
A. Operable Provisions
Section 1542 obliges the President to “consult with Congress before introducing United States 
Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations were imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly 
indicated by the circumstances . . . .”13  Section 1542 also mandates that the President “consult regu-
larly” with Congress until the troops are no longer engaged in hostilities.14 
Section 1543 requires that the President report to Congress, in the absence of  a declaration 
of  war, whenever he introduces armed forces abroad in certain situations.15  Those situations include 
when troops are introduced (1) into hostilities or imminent hostilities, (2) into the territory, airspace, 
or waters of  a foreign nation (except to supply, replace, repair, or train), or (3) in numbers which 
substantially enlarge the armed forces equipped for combat already in the foreign nation.16  Distin-
guishing between these three categories is not an arbitrary exercise.  As discussed below, categorizing 
under the latter two of  these three scenarios requires only that the President report to Congress.17 
Section 1544(b) provides the timing limitations on the unilateral Presidential introduction of  
troops.  “Within sixty calendar days after a report is submitted or is required to be submitted pursu-
ant to section 1543(a)(1). . . the President shall terminate any use of  United States Armed Forces . . 
. .”18  The sixty day period can be extended by an additional thirty days if  the President certifies to 
Congress in writing that the extension is necessary to safeguard the removal of  the troops.19  Curi-
ously, the only provision triggering the reporting provision is section 1543(a)(1), the introduction 
into hostilities or imminent hostilities.20  Based on the statutory language, a report filed under either 
Section 1543(a)(2) or 1543(a)(3) would not set the sixty-day clock ticking.21  Since the President is 
not required to specify under which subsection of  1543(a) he is filing his report, it is impossible for 
Congress to undeniably assert that the 60-day period had been triggered by a report filed pursuant 
12  See robert F. turner, rePealing the war Powers resolution 33–34 (1991); War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 
1541(a) (“It is the purpose of  this chapter to . . . insure that the collective judgment of  both the Congress and President 
will apply to introduction of  United States Armed Forces into hostilities . . . .”). 
13  See War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1542. 
14  See id. 
15  See id § 1543(a); see also riCharD F. griMMet, the war Powers resolution 4 (2002); Cyrus R. Vance, Striking 
the Balance: Congress and the President Under the War Powers Resolution, 133 u. Pa. l. rev. 79, 81–82 (1984).  The reporting 
requirement necessitates the President report to Congress within forty-eight hours after troops are deployed.
16  War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a)(1)-(3). 
17  See MarC. e. sMyrl, ConFliCt or CoDeterMination? 38 (1988).  In other words, only one scenario, introduction 
into “hostilities or imminent hostilities” under Section 1543(a)(1), triggers the other operable provisions of  the WPR.  Id.
18  War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (emphasis added).
19  Id.; see Vance, supra note 15, at 82.
20  War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b).
21  See Michael J. Glennon, The War Powers Resolution Ten Years Later: More Politics Than Law, 78 aM. J. int’l l. 571, 572 
(1984). 
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specifically to Section 1543(a)(1).22  
A crucial omission from the text of  the WPR is the definition of  what constitutes “hostilities” 
or “imminent hostilities.”  The state of  “hostilities” is precisely what distinguishes Section 1543(a)
(1)—initiating the oversight provisions in Section 1544—from Sections 1543(a)(2) and 1543(a)(3), 
which only mandate a presidential reporting requirement.23  The 1973 House report on its original 
war powers bill indicated the legislative intent behind the word “hostilities:”
[T]he word hostilities was substituted for the phrase armed conflict . . . because it was con-
sidered to be somewhat broader in scope. In addition to a situation in which fighting actually 
has begun, hostilities also encompass a state of  confrontation in which no shots have been 
fired, but in which there is a clear and present danger of  armed conflict.24
Since it was not included in the final version of  the WPR, this definition of  “hostilities” does 
not carry the force of  law, and the Executive has shown no inclination to adopt it.25  Section 1544(c) 
of  the WPR provides a mechanism for withdrawal separate from the automatic sixty day withdrawal 
provision.  The subsection requires the President to remove armed forces at any time if  Congress 
directs by concurrent resolution.26  The legal effectiveness of  both the automatic withdrawal provi-
sion in Section 1544(b) and the concurrent resolution in Section 1544(c) are discussed in depth later 
in this Article.
B. Widespread Noncompliance
One of  the pervasive criticisms of  the WPR has been the President’s ability to circumvent its 
language.27  Although its constitutionality is not seriously in question,28 presidents have largely ig-
nored the consultation requirement in Section 1542.  As history has shown, presidents have unilat-
erally deployed forces on a regular basis without first seeking to consult with Congress.29  Since the 
enactment of  the WPR, Section 1543(a)(1) (the time limit triggering provision) has been formally 
22  See id.  This is exactly what presidents have done over the years to easily circumvent the reporting requirement in 
section 1543(a)(1). 
23  See sMyrl, supra note 17, at 38–39.
24  Id. at 39 (quoting h.r. DoC. no. 93-287, at 7 (1973)).
25  See, e.g., Memorandum Opinion for the Attorney General: Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, (Apr. 1, 2011) 
[hereinafter Krass Memorandum]. 
26  War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1544(c). 
27  See, e.g., Glennon, Too Far Apart, supra note 7.
28   See Vance, supra note 15, at 87 (noting that Congress could not wisely or effectively exercises its war-making 
constitutional power without first possessing the necessary knowledge to act).  This specific consultation requirement is 
a clear example of  Congressing drafting a necessary and proper law to effectuate a constitutionally vested power. 
29  See, e.g., id.
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acknowledged in a presidential report only once.30  Of  the other more than ninety reports filed, the 
overwhelming majority have been labeled as either “consistent with the WPR” or “consistent with 
Section 1543 of  the WPR,”31 without specifying the exact subsection under which the report was 
being filed.  Other instances where U.S. forces have been deployed in potentially hostile situations 
simply have not been reported.32  Rather than “insur[ing] that the collective judgment of  both Con-
gress and the President”33 is employed in deciding when to use force in foreign affairs, the Executive 
has creatively circumvented (and sometimes completely neglected) the WPR.  The legal inoperability 
of  the WPR has made presidential evasion of  the WPR’s operable provisions commonplace in the 
decision to use armed forces abroad. 
iii. legal ineFFeCtiveness oF the wPr
A judicial reluctance to enforce the WPR’s operative provisions has been the impetus underlying 
widespread presidential circumvention of  the WPR.  The inarticulate drafting of  the WPR has often 
resulted in judicial application of  the political question doctrine, which thereby precludes judicial 
enforcement of  the WPR.  Furthermore, the unconstitutionality of  the one-house veto has been 
lingering over Section 1544(c) since the Supreme Court’s decision in INS v. Chadha.34  These two in-
dependent legal doctrines have coalesced to render the operable provisions of  the WPR unenforce-
able, reducing the WPR to a paper tiger wanting of  judicial consideration and enforcement. 
A. The Political Question Doctrine
First announced by the Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr,35 the political question doctrine holds 
that certain categories of  disputes are nonjusticiable or inappropriate for the courts to hear.36  In 
the arena of  foreign affairs, courts have been especially willing to decline to adjudicate cases, invok-
ing the political question doctrine where the court lacks the “institutional capacity to handle certain 
matters.”37  
In Crockett v. Reagan,38 twenty-nine members of  Congress sought declaratory judgment against 
the President for supplying military equipment and aid to the government of  El Salvador in viola-
tion of  the WPR.39  The President claimed that the military personnel sent to El Salvador were 
30  See Franck, supra note 7, at 769.  President Ford’s report citing section 1543(a)(1) was made during the Mayaguez 
rescue operation.  The report was made after the deployment of  a rescue team, where there was virtually no possibility 
of  the engagement lasting more than a few hours.  In situations where longer engagements have been contemplated, no 
section 1543(a)(1) reports have been filed.  See id. at 769  n.13.
31  See, e.g., griMMett, supra note 15, at 69–86.
32  See, e.g., id. at 87–88.
33  War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1541(a).
34  462 U.S. 919 (1983).
35  369 U.S. 186, 208-09 (1962).
36  See id.; see generally, thoMas M. FranCk, PolitiCal Questions/JuDiCial answers 35–39 (1992).
37  MiChael J. glennon, Constitutional DiPloMaCy 14–15 (1990).
38  558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982), aff ’d per curiam, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1251 (1984).
39  Id. at 895.
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performing a limited training and advisory function for the El Salvadorian military and, therefore, 
were not engaged in “hostilities” as contemplated in Section 1543(a)(1).40  The plaintiffs painted a 
different picture, claiming the military personnel were planning specific operations and working in 
areas exposed to heavy combat.41  The United States District Court for the District of  Columbia 
dismissed the case as nonjusticiable, concluding that the factfinding necessary to determine whether 
U.S. forces were introduced into hostilities was “appropriate for congressional, not judicial, investiga-
tion and determination.”42  Relying on Baker, the court categorized the case as one “characterized by 
a lack of  judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolution.”43
Less than a year later, the United States District Court for the District of  Columbia dismissed 
another alleged violation of  the WPR on identical grounds.44  Pertaining to U.S. sponsored para-
military activities in Nicaragua, the court dismissed the suit, holding that it “lack[ed] judicially dis-
coverable and manageable standards for resolving the dispute presented.”45  Courts have reaffirmed 
this position on numerous occasions.  In Lowry v. Reagan,46 the plaintiffs (comprising 113 members 
of  Congress) suffered a similar fate.  The court, asked to decide if  U.S. actions in the Persian Gulf  
constituted “hostilities,” declined to exercise jurisdiction over the claims, again citing the political 
question doctrine.  The court held: “[W]ith regard to cases concerning foreign relations, that these 
matters often ‘lie beyond judicial cognizance’ due [sic] the need for a ‘single-voiced statement of  the 
Government’s views.’”47  As noted in Sanchez-Espinoza,48 the court’s refusal to decide the questions 
of  hostilities was prompted, in part, due to the risk of  the “potentiality of  embarrassment [result-
ing] from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.”49  When a court is 
faced with an elusive set of  facts concerning foreign affairs and differing positions on the presence 
of  “hostilities” presented by the President and Congress, it will dismiss the dispute as nonjusticiable 
under the guise of  the political question doctrine.
The court’s exercise of  the political question doctrine, excusing itself  from deciding the differ-
ing positions of  the Executive and Congress, combines multiple aligning considerations.  First, as a 
40  Id. at 897.
41  Id. 
42  Id. at 898.
43  Id. The court went on to say that Congress possessed the resources and expertise needed to resolve the disputed 
questions of  fact concerning the presence of  “hostilities” in El Salvador.  Id. It also noted that, assuming the question 
of  fact were resolved, the only appropriate remedy it could order was a report being filed, thereby starting the sixty-day 
automatic withdrawal clock.  Id.
44  See Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 596 (D.D.C. 1983), aff ’d, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
45  Id. at 600.
46  676 F. Supp. 333, 336 (D.D.C. 1987) (finding the increased military action in the Persian Gulf, including a Navy 
ship firing on an Iranian ship and general naval escorts of  Kuwaiti tankers, was nonjusticiable).  
47  Id. at 339–40 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)). 
48  568 F. Supp. at 600.
49  Id. at 600 (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217). 
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practical matter, courts lack the institutional capacity to decide the presence of  hostilities.50  Second, 
the Constitution delegates foreign affairs decisions to the two political branches, not the courts.51  
Third, deciding the issue of  hostilities in foreign affairs would take the courts into “uncharted 
legal terrain,” where no law exists and applicable standards are wanting.52  Given the omission of  a 
definition of  “hostilities” in the WPR53 and the absence of  a workable legal standard, courts would 
have an extremely difficult time navigating this “uncharted terrain” in foreign affairs.  Consequently, 
courts have opted to leave the resolution of  the disputes to those elected branches both capable and 
constitutionally committed to making decisions concerning the use of  force abroad.54  Although not 
the only tool invoked by courts to skirt tough decisions concerning the separation of  war powers,55 
the political question doctrine is an oft-accepted argument by courts in justifying the dismissal of  
claims made pursuant to the WPR.56
B. The One-House Veto
Section 1544(c) of  the WPR authorizes Congress, via passage of  a concurrent resolution, to 
direct the President to remove troops engaged in hostilities (absent a declaration of  war or specific 
congressional authorization).  Notwithstanding the difficulties of  defining hostilities,57 the Supreme 
Court struck a devastating blow to this provision in I.N.S. v. Chadha.58  In Chadha, a provision of  the 
50  See Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1983), aff ’d per curiam, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. 
denied, 467 U.S. 1251 (1984) (“The Court lacks the resources and expertise (which are accessible to the Congress) to 
resolve disputed questions of  fact . . . .”); glennon, Constitutional DiPloMaCy, supra note 37, at 315.  But see Crockett, 
558 F. Supp. at 898–99 (“Were a court asked to declare that the War Powers Resolution was applicable to a situation like 
that in Vietnam, it would be absurd for it to decline to find that U.S. forces had been introduced into hostilities after 
50,000 American lives had been lost.”). 
51  See Ange v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 509, 512 (D.D.C 1990) (“Primary among the conditions is the textually demonstrable 
constitutional commitment of  the war powers to both political branches and the respect due [sic]  the political branches 
in allowing them to resolve this long-standing dispute over the war powers by exercising their constitutionally conferred 
powers.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Sanchez-Espinoza, 568 F. Supp. at 599 (“Matters intimately related to foreign 
policy and national security are rarely proper subjects for judicial intervention, inasmuch as they are so exclusively 
entrusted to the political branches of  government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference.”) 
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); glennon, Constitutional DiPloMaCy, supra note 37, at 315; 
Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of  Constitutional Law, 73 harv. l. rev. 1, 7–8 (1959). 
52  See glennon, Constitutional DiPloMaCy, supra note 37, at 315.
53  See discussion supra Part II.A.
54  See glennon, Constitutional DiPloMaCy, supra note 37, at 315.
55  For instance, courts have used theories of  remedial discretion, ripeness, and lack of  standing to dismiss claims 
alleging presidential violations of  the WPR.  See, e.g., Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1152 (D.D.C. 1990) (remedial 
discretion); Ange, 752 F. Supp. at 513 (ripeness); Cambel v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 23 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (standing).
56  Some commentators have argued that the operable provision of  the WPR (Section 1544(b)) is a prima facie 
unconstitutional infringement on the President’s constitutional power.  See, e.g., turner, supra note 12, at 113.  However, 
courts have not ruled on the constitutionality of  the WPR’s sixty-day time limit, and trying to define the parameters of  
where the President’s power to use force ends and Congress’s authority begins (or vice-versa) is an extensive task well 
beyond the scope of  this Note.
57  See discussion supra Part III.A. 
58  462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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Immigration and Naturalization Act allowed either chamber of  Congress, by passing a resolution, 
to reverse an Attorney General’s decision to suspend an alien’s deportation.59  The Court held that 
such congressional action “alter[ed] the legal rights, duties and relations of  persons . . . outside of  
the legislative branch,” and thus, the action equated to “legislation.”  Chief  Justice Burger concluded 
that, based on the structure of  the Constitution, the one-house veto violated the Presentment Clause 
since it was legislation not presented to the President.60  A concurrent resolution under Section 
1544(c) of  the WPR would undoubtedly alter the rights and duties of  the Executive and, thus, be 
legislative in nature.  After Chadha, this concurrent resolution would seemingly violate the Present-
ment Clause and therefore be unconstitutional.61  In Chadha, Justice White recognized the applica-
bility of  the one-house veto to the WPR, noting “[T]he legislative veto was . . . [t]he key provision 
of  the War Powers Resolution authoriz[ing] the termination by concurrent resolution of  the use of  
armed forces in hostilities.”62
Several arguments have been advanced to distinguish the Chadha one-house veto from the 
concurrent resolution of  Section 1544(c).  The most obvious argument (and easiest to dispose of) 
is that Chadha involved a one-house veto whereas Section 1544(c) utilizes a concurrent resolution.  
The credibility of  this argument vanished after the Supreme Court’s decision in Process Gas Consumers 
Group v. Consumer Energy Council, which explicitly extended Chadha to concurrent resolutions.63  
To reconcile with Process Gas Consumers Group, commentators argue that the differences in ratio-
nale underlying Chadha and Section 1544(c) render Chadha distinguishable.64  The strongest argument 
expounded is that the legislative veto in Chadha was designed to be a check on delegated authority 
to the Executive; the WPR, on the other hand, only codified congressional understanding of  the 
authority it possesses under the Constitution, without conferring any surplus authority to the Ex-
ecutive.65  Section 1548(d)(2) of  the WPR strengthens this argument by explicitly disavowing any 
interpretation of  the WPR as granting the President additional constitutional authority.66  Since there 
is no delegation of  authority to the Executive, there cannot be a reserved right to veto the delegated 
59  Id. at 923–29.
60  Id. at 954–55 (“Disagreement with the Attorney General’s decision on Chadha’s deportation . . . involves 
determinations of  policy that Congress can implement in only one way; bicameral passage followed by presentment 
to the President.”).  The Presentment Clause states that “[e]very Bill which shall have passed the House of  
Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of  the United States: If  he 
approve he shall sign it, but if  not he shall return it . . . .” u.s. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.  
61  Like the Immigration and Naturalization Act in question in Chadha, the WPR contains a separability clause.  
War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1548.  Thus, if  the concurrent resolution in Section 1544(c) were held to be 
unconstitutional, the remainder of  the WPR would not be invalidated with it.
62  Chadha, 462 U.S. at 970 (White, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
63  See Process Gas Consumers Grp. v. Consumer Energy Council, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983). 
64  See, e.g., John H. Ely, Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act that Worked, 88 ColuM. l. rev. 1379, 1395–98; Vance, 
supra note 15, at 86–87.
65  See Sidney Buchanan, In Defense of  the War Powers Resolution: Chadha Does not Apply, 22 hous. l. rev. 1155, 1178 
(1985). 
66  War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1547(d)(2) (“Nothing in this joint resolution . . . shall be construed as granting 
any authority to the President . . . he would not have had in the absence of  this joint resolution.”). 
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authority (in the form of  a legislative veto), and therefore, Chadha does not apply.67  Although a logi-
cal argument, it suffers the fatal flaw of  presupposing that the decision in Chadha is subject to subtle 
distinctions.  Rather, it appears the highly formalistic Chadha majority opinion is “a work of  mechan-
ical simplicity,”68 suggesting no proclivity to attempt to distinguish between refined differentiations 
underlying the rationale of  legislative vetoes.  This formalistic reading of  the majority opinion is 
bolstered by the sweeping claims made by the concurrence and dissent in Chadha,69 as well as subse-
quent court decisions interpreting it.70  Although not universally agreed upon, it is highly likely that 
the Supreme Court would rule that the concurrent resolution provision of  Section 1544(c) of  the 
WPR is unconstitutional.71 
C. Criticisms of  the WPR
To promulgate a workable solution to the WPR, it is first necessary to discuss the present criti-
cisms of  the statute.  Several salient criticisms emerge from the resounding sea of  disapprovals the 
WPR has accumulated throughout its long and oft-attacked history.  As discussed earlier, the first 
and most transparent criticism of  the WPR stems from widespread (virtually unanimous) and long-
standing presidential refusal to comply with both the WPR’s text and spirit.72  The logical corollary is 
that the WPR has failed to prevent the President from unilaterally deploying armed forces abroad.73   
Instead of  fostering an environment conducive to collaboration between the political branches when 
67  Buchanan, supra note 65, at 1178; Vance, supra note 15, at 86–87. 
68  Allan Ides, Congress, Constitutional Responsibility and the War Power, 17 loy. l.a. l. rev. 599, 630 n.101 (1984) 
(“Instead of  examining the particular veto legislative in a constitutional context, the Court adopted a rigid textual 
formula that virtually ensures that all legislative vetoes will be struck down . . . .”).  
69   Both Justice Powell and Justice White noted that the majority opinion would render all legislative vetoes 
unconstitutional.  Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959–60 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 974 (White, J., dissenting). 
70  See, e.g., williaM J. riCh, MoDern Constitutional law 402–03 (3d ed. 2011) (noting that when confronted with 
legislative veto cases the Supreme Court has “continued to take a rule-oriented approach, and to reject arguments for 
flexibility or experimentation”). 
71  Of  course, the unconstitutionality of  Section 1544(c) presupposes that Congress possess the political will to 
terminate hostilities by invoking the concurrent resolution, a presupposition that has yet to occur in the almost forty 
years the WPR has been on the books.  See 50 U.S.C. §1544(c).
72  See discussion supra Part II.B.  Widespread presidential circumvention of  the operable provisions of  the WPR, 
see, e.g., Krass Memorandum, supra note 25, certainly has not “insure[d] that the collective judgment of  both the 
Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of  United States Armed Forces into hostilities” as originally 
contemplated by the WPR.  See War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §1541(a). 
73  See Krass Memorandum, supra note 25, at 7 (referring to multiple instances the President has deployed force abroad 
without congressional approval, including, to name a few, deployments to: Libya (1986), Panama (1989), Somalia (1992), 
Bosnia (1995), Haiti (1994 & 2004), and Yugoslavia (1999)).  The Justice Department’s memo took the historical practice 
unilateral presidential uses of  force one step further, claiming that the longstanding use of  military force abroad in the 
absence of  prior congressional approval added to the “gloss” placed on the Executive’s constitutional authority.  See 
id. at 6 (quoting, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952)) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) 
[hereinafter Steel Seizure Case].  This position has not been without sharp criticism.  See MiChael J. glennon, The Cost 
of  “Empty Words”: A Comment on the Justice Department’s Libya Opinion (Apr. 6, 2011), http://harvardnsj.org/2011/04/the-
cost-of-empty-words-a-comment-on-the-justice-departments-libya-opinion/.
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deciding to introduce forces into hostilities, the WPR has instead allowed the Executive to fashion 
creative arguments to exploit the poor statutory drafting of  the WPR and to evade the WPR’s cen-
tral purpose.  While these criticisms demonstrate an overall failure of  the WPR to achieve its articu-
lated goal, several other flaws in the WPR remain.74
Another unforeseen consequence of  the WPR’s statutory language, fatal to its proper opera-
tion, has been a reversal in the originally contemplated roles of  the President and Congress.  Since 
the “hostilities” report pursuant to Section 1543(a)(1) is the only provision to set the sixty-day clock 
ticking,75 presidents have continually refused to specify under which Section 1543(a)provision they 
are filing.76  The consequence of  presidential circumvention of  this poorly drafted statutory language 
has transformed the “automaticity” of  the sixty-day limiting provision into a “procedural edifice 
[that] turned out to be a house of  cards.”77  The house of  cards collapsed when the assumption that 
presidents would specify what section a report was filed under turned out to be a fallacy.  Originally 
thought to be the obligation of  the President to specify the relevant subsection, it was never con-
templated that Congress would be statutorily compelled to declare that hostilities were in effect.78  
This role reversal—having Congress, not the President, being forced to implement the resolution by 
declaring hostilities are afoot—renders the self-activating nature of  resolution inapposite.  
Another salient criticism hovering around the WPR relates to its failure to focus the debate sur-
rounding the wisdom of  using force abroad.  The WPR, as originally contemplated, was supposed 
to create a sixty-day window, forcing the President and Congress to debate the wisdom of  deploy-
ing forces (or keeping deployed forces) abroad.79  Instead, the WPR has undesirably transformed 
the foreign policy debate into a “miasma of  legalities.”80  The absence of  the ticking clock to force a 
conversation concerning the wisdom of  using force abroad has left a void in the foreign policy de-
bate.  Unfortunately, this void has been filled with esoteric arguments relating to the constitutionality 
of  foreign policy initiatives, not the overarching prudence of  such actions.81  The shifting emphasis 
of  debate, from the wisdom of  the use of  force to the constitutionality of  such actions, has reduced 
the WPR into a byzantine legal edifice, devoid of  public comprehension or interest.82  The preva-
lence of  these criticisms amplifies the need for amending the WPR.
iv. Fixing the war Powers resolution
As the WPR currently stands, constitutional power in foreign affairs is a zero-sum game.  As 
presidential power expands, congressional power retracts.  The expanse of  presidential power has 
74 
75  See discussion supra Part II.A.
76  See discussion supra Part II.B.
77  See Glennon, The War Powers Resolution Ten Years Later, supra note 21, at 573.
78  Id. at 574. 
79  See War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1552 (consultation requirement); robert F. turner, the war Powers 
resolution: its iMPleMentation in theory anD PraCtiCe 12 (1983). 
80  See Franck, Rethinking War Powers, supra note 7, at 770.
81  Id.; see also Glennon, Too Far Apart, supra note 7, at 31.
82  See glennon, Constitutional DiPloMaCy, supra note 37, at 121.
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severely negated congressional influence in the war powers discussion.83  It is readily possible to 
amend the WPR to create “a compact between Congress and the President for making the Constitu-
tion work in what is generally admitted to be a gray area.”84  However, without the courts serving as 
independent arbitrators, the disputes between these two branches will go unchecked.  Thus far, the 
judiciary has failed to bolster congressional standing in the arena of  foreign affairs.85  Modest chang-
es to the language and structure of  the WPR can create substantial changes to the operation of  the 
statute, fostering an environment conducive to cooperation between the branches while simultane-
ously forcing the judiciary to moderate disputes.
A. Solving the Political Question Riddle
Currently, the WPR contains no manageable standards for a court (or the public) to determine 
when the President must obtain congressional approval prior to deploying armed forces abroad.86  
Courts have acknowledged, at the very least, a potential willingness to adjudicate disputes between 
the political branches in the WPR context.87  However, without clear, simple standards to apply, 
courts will continue to be sidelined by the limits of  their institutional capacity to handle political 
questions.  To rectify this, Congress could make minimal alterations to the WPR.  First, a definition 
of  “hostilities” is necessary.  As articulated in the House Committee report, the word “hostilities” 
was substituted for “armed conflict” to broaden the scope of  the WPR.88  The report continued:
[I]n addition to a situation in which fighting has actually begun, hostilities also encompasses 
a state of  confrontation in which no shots have been fired but where there is a clear and 
present danger of  armed conflict. Imminent hostilities denotes a situation in which there is a 
clear potential either for such a state of  confrontation or for actual armed conflict.89 
 With this clear definition, courts would have a workable standard making the issue of  when 
“hostilities” originated a justiciable contention.90  As raised in Lowry v. Reagan,91 without a feasible 
definition of  hostilities, courts will continue abstaining from deciding war powers disputes lying 
“beyond judicial cognizance.”92  Defining hostilities is a crucial step to alleviating the political ques-
83  Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins In Foreign Affairs: Lessons of  the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 
yale l.J. 1255 (1988).
84  Pat M. holt, the war Powers resolution: the role oF Congress in u.s. arMeD intervention 1 (1978).
85  See discussion supra Part III. 
86  See Franck, Rethinking War Powers, supra note 7, at 772.
87  See Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893, 898–99 (D.D.C. 1982) (“Were a court asked to declare that the War 
Powers Resolution was applicable to a situation like Vietnam, it would be absurd for it to decline that U.S. forces had 
been introduced into hostilities . . . .”). 
88  glennon, Constitutional DiPloMaCy, supra note 37, at 114 n.241 (quoting h.r. reP. no. 93-287 (1973)).
89  Id.
90  Using this definition, launching hundreds of  tomahawk missiles to enforce a no-fly zone in Libya would 
undoubtedly constitute an “armed conflict” triggering the reporting requirement.  See supra text accompanying note 1.
91  676 F. Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1987).
92  Id. at 340.
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tion riddle. 
Perhaps more important than the court’s ability to resolve a political question is the court’s willing-
ness to do so.  Restraining the alteration of  the WPR to simply include a definition of  “hostilities” 
leaves the applicable judicial remedy—declaring that the President must file a hostilities report—
with far less stark consequences than a non-statutory alternative.93  A judicial remedy only triggering 
the sixty-day clock to begin ticking produces a more judicially tolerable result than forcing an imme-
diate, and potentially harmful, extraction of  troops.94  Radical changes to the structure of  the WPR 
(or a complete repeal of  the WPR) would result in the judiciary being left with limited remedies 
beyond injunctive relief.  If  this were the case, courts would continue to veil themselves behind the 
political question masquerade to avoid the “dark specter” of  potentially issuing an injunctive order 
compelling troops engaged in combat to stop fighting.95  However, a court’s affirmative interpreta-
tion of  the presence of  “hostilities” would only set the sixty-day clock ticking, forcing a dialogue 
between the President and Congress.96 This judicial remedy resolves the political questions while still 
“giv[ing] appropriate deference” to the branches “constitutionally empowered to conduct foreign 
relations.”97
A simple deletion from the WPR could prevent continuing presidential evasion of  the operable 
provision in Section 1543.  Since the reporting requirement does not necessitate the President to 
specify under what provision of  Section 1543 he is reporting,98 Sections 1543(a)(2) and 1543(a)(3) 
should be deleted from the statute.  This deletion would end the “semantic circumvention” of  the 
sixty-day clock via presidential gamesmanship refusing to specify what provision of  Section 1543 he 
is filing under.99  Left with only one operable provision, any report filed (or judicially ordered to be 
filed) would trigger the sixty-day clock.  Furthermore, Sections 1543(a)(2) and 1543(a)(3), if  followed 
literally, would result in superfluous information that need not be conveyed to Congress given the 
93  Such non-statutory alternatives could include ordering an injunction compelling the troops to stop fighting and 
withdraw from the armed conflict.
94  See Franck, Rethinking War Powers , supra note 7, at 153.  Mr. Franck sums up this point nicely, stating, “Foreign 
relations can and should be conducted in accordance with the law, but not as invoked by the blade of  a judicial 
guillotine.”  Id.
95  Id.  
96  See Crockett v. Regan, 558 F. Supp. 893, 899 (D.D.C. 1982) (“Even if  the factfinding here did not require resolution 
of  a political question, this Court would not order withdrawal of  U.S. forces at this juncture.  At most, it could order 
that a report be filed.  This conclusion is based upon the structure and legislative history of  the WPR.”).  It is possible 
for other judicial remedies, such as deciding when hostilities began and starting the clock retroactively from that 
date.  However, this approach has two main flaws.  First, it would require the judiciary to perform a historical inquiry 
deciding exactly when in time the hostilities became imminent, a daunting task eliciting feelings of  political question 
non-justiciability.  Second, it could result in a court concluding the sixty-day window had closed, thereby ordering the 
President to remove troops.  This order both risks presidential disobedience and renders a judicially invoked close to 
hostilities without ever fostering a dialogue between the President and Congress concerning the wisdom of  the deployed 
force.  See Ely, supra note 64, at 1417.
97  See Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 596, 599 (D.D.C. 1983) (dismissing a lawsuit brought against the 
Reagan administration for actions in Nicaragua on grounds that it presented a nonjusticiable political question).
98  See discussion supra Part II.A. 
99  See glennon, Constitutional DiPloMaCy, supra note 37, at 114.
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stated goal of  the WPR.100  Terminating these non-essential provisions would clarify the WPR while 
simultaneously closing a loophole frequently exploited by the Executive. 
B. Constitutional Framework
Aside from making the conflicts under the WPR justiciable, the second major revamping of  
the WPR should occur in Section 1544(b).  The constitutionality of  the section has never been 
resolved,101 and a consensus among legal scholars is nonexistent.  Some commentators view the 
automatic withdrawal provision as an unconstitutional infringement on the President’s unitary power 
as commander-in-chief,102 while others view the provision as striking the correct balance between the 
shared war power of  Congress and the President set forth by the text and structure of  the Constitu-
tion.103  
Although the balance of  power between the political branches in the foreign affairs arena is by 
no means concrete,104 past Supreme Court cases outline vague parameters concerning the allocation 
of  war powers.  The President’s Article II power as Commander-in-Chief  vests with it a degree of  
limited power to unilaterally decide to employ armed forces in certain circumstances.105  The explicit 
100  The stated goal of  the WPR is to “insure the collective judgment” of  the President and Congress when 
introducing armed forces into “hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly 
indicated by the circumstances.”  War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1541(a).  With this as the stated goal, why Congress 
felt it needed information concerning the introduction of  armed forces “into the territory . . . of  a foreign nation 
while equipped for combat” of  reports when troops “substantially enlarge” the U.S. presence in a foreign country is 
inexplicable given the logical disconnect of  these two provisions’ language with the language of  the articulated goal.  
See id. § 1543(a)(2)–(3).  Notwithstanding the logical disconnect of  these two sections, the technical language of  the 
provisions would require the President to file superfluous reports.  For instance, when a U.S. pilot flies a cargo plane 
over the United Kingdom en route to the Middle East while carrying a loaded pistol, a report would have to be filed 
under the literal language of  Section 1543(a)(2).  Likewise, if  the military conducts a parade in a country with little other 
American armed forces present, a colorable argument arises that the military presence was “substantially enlarge[d],” 
warranting a report under Section 1543(a)(3).   
101  See, e.g., Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333, 341 (D.D.C. 1987) (dismissing the complaint while noting that if  
Congress had presented a ripe issue, the court could have analyzed the constitutionality of  the WPR). 
102  See, e.g., turner, the war Powers resolution, supra note 79, at 108 (“The idea that Congress can . . . deprive 
the President of  a fundamental expressed constitutional power . . . is incompatible with our system of  separation of  
powers.”).
103  See, e.g., glennon, Cost oF eMPty worDs, supra note 73, at 2–3.  Interestingly, at one point the Office of  Legal 
Counsel to the President wrote “The practical effect of  the 60-day limit is to shift the burden to the President to 
convince the Congress of  the continuing need for the use of  our armed forces abroad . . . .  We cannot say that placing 
that burden on the President unconstitutionally intrudes upon his executive powers.”  Presidential Power to Use Armed 
Forces Abroad without Statutory Authorization, 4A Op. Office of  the Legal Counsel, Dep’t of  Justice 185, 196 (1980).  Not 
surprisingly, this quote has not been reiterated or acknowledged in subsequent memos spawned by the Executive branch.
104  See supra Part III.
105  See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165–66 (1803) (“By the constitution of  the United States, the 
President is invested with certain important political powers, in the exercise of  which he is to use his own discretion, and 
is accountable only to his country in his political character, and to his own conscience . . . .  [W]hatever opinion may be 
entertained of  the manner in which executive discretion may be used, still there exists, and can exist, no power to control 
that discretion.”).
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right of  Congress to declare war counterbalances this autonomous presidential power.106  Further-
more, while historical practice demonstrates that the President may engage in less formal hostilities 
without a declaration of  war,107 case law indicates that Congress may regulate the boundaries of  less 
formal hostilities.108 
Furthermore, when analyzing constitutional disputes, it is necessary to view presidential power 
relevant to its disjunction or conjunction with that of  Congress.109  As famously spelled out by Jus-
tice Jackson, this analysis precedes by categorizing the presidential action in one of  three zones.110  
When the President acts “pursuant to . . . an authorization [by] Congress, his authority is at [a] 
maximum.”111  The converse is also true; when the President “takes measures incompatible with the . 
. . will of  Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb . . . .”112  Lastly, when the President acts and is met 
with congressional silence, he operates in a “zone of  twilight,” where the distribution of  powers is 
uncertain and “congressional inertia” may enable the presidential action.113
C. Authorization for Unilateral Presidential Action
Using these cases as a constitutional framework, Congress should make several amendments to 
Section 1544(b) to strengthen its position with respect to the President.  First (and perhaps counter-
intuitively), Congress should articulate the instances where the President, acting without the need 
for Congressional consent, can unilaterally engage in hostilities.114  These limited instances should 
be carefully articulated and based on both practical necessity and policy realities.115  For instance, 
Congress should explicitly authorize the President to use armed forces without consent (1) to repel 
an armed attack on United States or its armed forces, and (2) to effectuate the prompt recovery of  
U.S. citizens held captive abroad.116  Both of  these provisions share a commonality: recognizing the 
institutional difficulties of  Congress in making rapid decisions during a time of  crisis.117  The more 
106  u.s. Const. art. I, § 8.
107  See supra note 73 (discussing the “historical gloss” placed on the presidency).
108  See Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804) (holding that a presidential order contradicting a congressional 
statute during hostilities between the U.S. and France was invalid). 
109  See Steel Seizure Case, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
110  Id. at 635–38.
111  Id. at 635–37.
112  Id. at 637.
113  Id.
114  Although Section 1541(c) of  the WPR appears to spell out the instances where the President can deploy force 
unilaterally, it fails for two reasons.  First, the section is merely a prefatory declaration.  See Franck, Rethinking War Powers, 
supra note 7, at 771–72.  Second, the Committee Conference Report explicitly states that the operative provisions of  the 
WPR “are not dependent on the language of  this subsection.”  h.r. reP. no. 93-547 (1988) (Conf. Rep.). 
115  Although there is mention of  the constitutional power of  the President, see War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. 
§1541(c), this provision carries no legal implications with respect to the remainder of  the WPR. 
116  See Durand v. Hollins, 8 F. Cas. 111, 112 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860) (No. 4186) (“Now as it respects the interposition of  
the executive abroad, for the protection of  the lives or property of  the citizen, the duty must, of  necessity, rest in the 
discretion of  the President.”); Franck, Rethinking War Powers, supra note 7, at 772.
117  See turner, the war Powers resolution, supra note 79, at 109.
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complex the foreign policy decision, the longer the congressional debate, potentially risking the 
safety of  Americans and losing the benefits of  decisiveness.118  As a practical policy matter, typical 
hostage rescue missions run virtually no risk of  extending beyond a sixty-day window.119  Similarly, 
an armed attack on the United States necessitates decisive action, which the Executive branch is far 
better suited to handle than the legislature.120  Within these specified areas, the President would pos-
sess authorization to deploy armed forces exclusively at his discretion. 
D. Congress’s Ability to Limit the President in the Zone of  Twilight
Practical matters aside, this explicit authorization of  unilateral presidential actions produces a 
“zone of  twilight,” in which Congress and the President have concurrent authority.121  In this sce-
nario, congressional “inertia, indifference or quiescence”122 enables the President to continue military 
actions without the expressed disapproval of  Congress.  This position is consistent with the histori-
cal prevalence of  presidential use of  military actions abroad without prior congressional approval.123  
Further, the “systematic, unbroken executive practice” of  unilaterally deploying troops in the face 
of  unsuccessful (or nonexistent) congressional legal and political challenges124 reinforces (and helps 
create) the “gloss” on the Presidency.125  Since a legal challenge on this longstanding presidential 
practice would be difficult to effectuate,126 acknowledging the existence of  a sphere of  limited, yet 
unilateral, Executive power helps further a constitutionally sound revamping of  the WPR.  
 Although this allowance of  presidential action in a twilight zone may seem to expand presiden-
tial power contrary to the stated goal of  the WPR, in effect, the opposite is true.  First, the pressures 
of  public opinion have a pervasive influence on presidential decisions.127  However, given that public 
118  Id.
119  Cf. id. at 68–71 (suggesting that once a President authorizes a rescue mission, the mission would not rarely take 
more than sixty days to complete).
120  See id. at 109.
121  See Steel Seizure Case, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
122  Id.
123  See Krass Memorandum, supra note 25, at 7 (“[T]he pattern of  executive conduct, made under claim of  
right, extended over many decades and engaged in by Presidents of  both parties, evidences the existence of  broad 
constitutional power.”). 
124  See Steel Seizure Case, 343 U.S. at 610–11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also J. Richard Broughton, What is it Good 
For? War Power, Judicial Review, and Constitutional Deliberation, 54 okla. l. rev. 685, 689–90 (2001) (“Indeed, Congress has 
continually acquiesced in presidential decision making regarding the use of  American troops in hostilities around the 
globe.”). 
125  See Steel Seizure Case, 343 U.S. at 610–11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also MiChael a. genovese & robert J. 
sPitzer, the PresiDenCy anD the Constitution: Cases anD Controversies 30 (2005). 
126  See genovese & sPitzer, supra note 125, at 30 (quoting Justice Frankfurter’s concurring opinion in the Steel 
Seizure case, enunciating that “systematic” and  “unbroken” presidential exercises of  authority, which Congress 
acknowledges without challenge, become “part of  the structure of  our government”).
127  See, e.g., Susan Page, Polls Can Affect President’s Hold on Party, usa toDay, July 20, 2009, at A6, available at http://
www.usatoday.com/news/washington/presidential-approval-tracker.htm (asserting that public opinion bears directly 
upon the critical factor in gathering necessary legislative cooperation: political capital).
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disapproval was not sufficient to bring a timely end to the Vietnam conflict,128 this alone does not 
reliably safeguard against prolonged Executive misuse of  the armed forces.  Other provisions serve 
to statutorily reinforce the power of  public disapproval.  For instance, the President would still be 
bound by the confines of  the sixty-day limiting provision.129  Also, congressional action in disjunc-
tion with the presidential use of  force would place his power “at its lowest ebb,” subject to the strict-
est judicial scrutiny.130  Defining a “zone of  twilight” in the foreign affairs arena does not infringe on 
a historically exercised presidential right and simultaneously casts into place congressional checks on 
the Executive’s power. 
As briefly discussed above, Congress, by passing a law in disjunction with the President’s actions 
within the “zone of  twilight,” could regulate less formal military engagements.131  Little v. Barreme132 
bolsters the proposition that Congress can police the standards of  informal hostilities.133  If  Con-
gress passed a law regulating presidential action within less formal hostilities, any presidential mat-
ter incompatible with the expressed provision would shift the President from operating in Jackson’s 
“twilight” to the third category, subjecting the presidential action to strict judicial scrutiny.134  Pro-
posed parameters to less formal hostilities would serve as an invitation to the President to negotiate 
with Congress, lobbying his case for foreign intervention on the merits, rather than circumventing 
the issue on legal technicalities. 
E. Congressional Power of  the Purse
A final amendment to Section 1544(b) would replace the automatic withdrawal of  troops provi-
sion with an automatic withholding of  funds for presidential actions exceeding the sixty-day limit 
(without statutory authorization) after filing the hostilities report.  Presumably, if  a President refused 
to terminate the use of  armed forces after the expiration of  the sixty-day window135 the President 
would be acting against the explicit will of  Congress and therefore his power would be at its “lowest 
ebb.”136  However, this analysis, like many of  those in the separation of  powers context, is riddled 
with complications.  To begin, a President would likely declare Section 1544(b) to be an unconstitu-
tional infringement on his Article II powers, simply leading him to disregard the statutory mandate 
128  See sMyrl, supra note 17, at 12–13 (noting that President Nixon continued the war despite his promise to end it 
and amid increasing violence at protests).
129  See supra Section II.A (explaining the operative effect of  the sixty-day limit).  As discussed supra Part IV.A, this 
assumes that the proposed amendments were enacted, thereby reducing the efficacy and prevalence of  the political 
question doctrine.
130  Steel Seizure Case, 343 U.S. at 637–38 (Jackson, J., concurring).  In extreme cases, impeachment (or the threat 
thereof) could also be a viable option available to Congress to limit the President. 
131  Franck, Rethinking War Powers, supra note 7, at 772–73.
132  6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804). 
133  See id.; Franck, Rethinking War Powers, supra note 7, at 772.
134  Steel Seizure Case, 343 U.S. at 637–38.
135  See War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §1544(b).
136  See Steel Seizure Case, 343 U.S. at 637–38.
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and continue the military operations.137  Congressional reliance on a judicial remedy in this context 
may prove to be misguided.  In Ange v. Bush,138 the United States District Court for the District of  
Columbia indicated a strong reluctance to decide disputes between the political branches in the war 
powers theater.139  The court noted, “Meddling by the judicial branch in determining the allocation 
of  constitutional powers where the text of  the Constitution appears ambiguous as to the allocation 
of  those powers ‘extends judicial power beyond the limits inherent in the constitutional scheme for 
dividing federal power.’”140  On a more fundamental level, a directive terminating the use of  armed 
forces possesses strong undertones of  a Commander-in-Chief-like dictate.  These undertones are ex-
acerbated by both the lack of  textual support for the mandate and the alternative approaches avail-
able to Congress firmly based in constitutional text. 
Due to Section 1544(b)’s possible infringement on the President’s Article II power, as well as 
the latent possibility of  judicial abstention from deciding the dispute, Congress should amend the 
Section’s language to ground it in an expressly conveyed constitutional power, namely the power 
over the purse.141  Attaching a fund cutoff  forcefully bolsters the constitutionality of  Section 1544(b) 
because it derives from an exclusively legislative power, rather than the “often usurped and much 
disputed congressional war-making power.”142  Couching the automatic cutoff  provision pursuant to 
an expressed congressional power solves the problem voiced by the court in Ange v. Bush, not requir-
ing judicial “meddling” into constitutionally ambiguous allocations of  power.143  Further, attaching 
the WPR to the power of  the purse is consistent with the Framers’ understanding of  the balance of  
war powers in the Constitution.  As James Madison noted, “For there never was, and I can say never 
will be, an efficient government, in which both are not vested.  The only rational meaning is that the 
sword and the purse are not to be given to the same member.”144  As the Framers recognized, the 
primary check on presidential use of  the military is the unequivocal power of  the purse in the hands 
137  See, e.g., Krass Memorandum, supra note 25 (failing to acknowledge a situation, other than “a planned military 
engagement that constitutes a ‘war,’” which would impose a constitutionally-based limit on presidential authority to 
employ armed forces); Koh, supra note 83, at 1264. 
138  752 F. Supp. 509 (D.D.C. 1990).
139  See id. at 514 (explaining the operative effect of  the sixty-day limit).
140  Id. (quoting Riegle v. Fed. Open Mkt. Comm., 656 F.2d 873, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (citations and internal quotations 
omitted)). 
141  u.s. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.  This amendment could read in relevant part: “no funds made available by any law, 
other than those explicitly authorizing the engagement in hostilities in question, may be expended to carry on hostilities.” 
This would be inserted in place of  the “President shall terminate any use of  Armed Forces . . .” language used in Section 
1544(b). 
142  Michael J. Glennon, Strengthening the War Powers Resolution: The Case for Purse Strings Restrictions, 60  Minn. l. rev. 
1, 33 (1975).   There is virtually no question of  Congress’s ability to make funds available for specific purposes and 
specified periods of  time.  Likewise, cutting off  funds based on a contingency—the expiration of  the sixty-day clock 
after a hostilities report is filed—is certainly not unprecedented.  Id. (citing Foreign Assistance Act of  1961, Pub. L. No. 
87-195, § 620(x) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2370(x) (2006)). 
143  See Ange v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 509, 514 (D.D.C. 1990) (“Congress has many options to check the President.  
Congress can . . . exercise its appropriations power to prevent further offensive and/or defensive military action . . . . ”).
144  John C. Yoo, CLIO at War: The Misuse of  History in the War Powers Debate, 70 u. Colo. l. rev. 1169, 1206–07 
(1999) (quoting 2 DoCuMentary history oF the ratiFiCation oF the Constitution 1282 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976)).
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of  the legislature.145 
Automatic fund withholding after the expiration of  sixty days (and without statutory authoriza-
tion) has several strengths.  First, with the WPR as written, political impasses are inevitable and ju-
dicial resolution is unobtainable, leaving Congress with one option—the immediate cutoff  of  funds 
for the support of  forces engaged in hostilities.146  The clear language of  this amendment would put 
the President on notice of  the pending unavailability of  funding to continue operations.147  The stark 
consequences resulting from a political stalemate between the branches would pressure both sides to 
reach an accord or face the political reverberations in the next election.  Most importantly, a loom-
ing (and actually enforceable) deadline would effectuate the stated goal of  the WPR,148 creating an 
environment where cooperation between the political branches was not only wise, but necessary. 
v. ConClusion
On October 20, 2011, the District Court for the District of  Columbia dismissed Representative 
Dennis Kucinich’s lawsuit against President Obama claiming a violation of  the WPR for the Presi-
dent’s use of  force in Libya.149  A frustrated court “express[ed] its dismay that the plaintiffs [were] 
seemingly using the limited resources of  [the] Court to achieve what appear[ed] to be purely politi-
cal ends, when it should [have been] clear to them that [the] Court  [was] powerless to depart from 
clearly established precedent of  the Supreme Court and the District of  Columbia Circuit.” 150  As the 
court made clear, the WPR is fundamentally broken.  Courts will not fix the problem for Congress.  
The WPR has not fostered an environment conducive to shared participation in the war powers 
arena as originally contemplated.  In a field where constitutional parameters allocating power are 
tenuous, Representative Kucinich’s lawsuit perpetuates the WPR’s status as a fierce paper tiger, while 
doing nothing to rectify a problem spanning almost three decades.  Without legal bite, the WPR will 
continue to fail at achieving its original mandate.  However, modest changes to the language of  the 
WPR can make it a constitutionally operable statute that necessitates political cooperation in the 
decision to use force abroad while allowing judicial resolution.
145  See id.  In fact, during the ratification debates between Federalists and Antifederalists, the latter did not ever 
mention congressional power to declare war as a potential check on the executive.  Rather, the Antifederalists saw a 
President bent on war as being able to achieve that goal, with the legislature’s control over finances as the primary check.  
Id.  
146  See Vance, supra note 15, at 93 (favoring an amendment which would stop the flow of  any funds supporting forces 
engaged in hostilities beyond the term of  legislative approval, both direct and indirect).
147  See id. (suggesting such an amendment would be an appropriate deterrent because the executive would no longer 
have the ability to redirect funds appropriated for other purposes).
148  See War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §1541(a) (ensuring cooperation between the political branches when 
introducing armed forces into hostilities).
149  See Kucinich v. Obama, No. 11-1096, 2011 WL 5005303, at *1 (D.D.C. Oct. 20, 2011). 
150  Id. at *4 n.4.  Representative Kucinich was also the lead plaintiff  in Kucinich v. Bush, 236 F.2d 1 (D.D.C. 2002), in 
which the court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims against the President citing a nonjusticiable political question. 
